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CONNICK V. THOMPSON: FORSAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS FOR FEAR OF FLOODING LITIGATION AND
Loss OF MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY
INTRODUCTION
In a remarkable decision over forty years ago, the United States Su-
preme Court in Brady v. Maryland launched the modern development of
prosecutorial disclosure requirements designed to uphold the due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Almost a century before the
Brady Court's touchstone discovery rule, our nation anticipated the need
to protect individual due process rights legislatively. 3 The Forty-second
Congress introduced 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to target misconduct by govern-
ment officials and provide a remedy for individual protections secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Coupling Brady and § 1983, a common
goal shines through: fair treatment of the accused by those with the pow-
er to ensure it.
Brady and § 1983 are intended to ensure individual justice; howev-
er, the promises of Brady have largely not materialized, and the protec-
tions set out in § 1983 have been met with ever-changing interpreta-
tions.5 In Connick v. Thompson,6 the United States Supreme Court had
the opportunity to address both of these longstanding ideals and reset the
focus on fair practices and just results.7 Yet the Court, clouded by a fear
of overwhelming the court system and diminishing government autono-
my, failed to take such a stand. In effect, the Court shied further away
from the goals and protections sought in Brady and § 1983.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the history and case law
behind the development of the Brady rule and the evolution of § 1983 in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
3. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 511, 512-
13 (1989).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 513.
5. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEx. L. REV.
685, 686-87 (2006) (detailing the dissonance between the grand expectations of Brady and the grim
reality of criminal litigation today). For a discussion of the evolution of § 1983 in American juris-
prudence, see Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516-18.
6. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
7. See id. at 1356 (addressing "whether a district attorney's office may be held liable under §
1983 for failure to train based on a single Brady violation").
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history, and opinions in Thompson. Part III asserts three propositions: (1)
the Thompson Court failed to recognize the ideals of Brady and the im-
portance of training prosecutors in Brady evidence; (2) the Court retreat-
ed from the purpose of § 1983 due to an unfounded fear of overwhelm-
ing the court system and diminishing government autonomy; and (3) the
Thompson Court could have maintained a high standard of § 1983 liabil-
ity and ruled in Thompson's favor. This Comment concludes that
Connick v. Thompson was wrongly decided, and in neglecting the prom-
ises of Brady and § 1983, the Court compromised individual rights guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 1983: Expansion of Supreme Court Jurisprudence for the
Protection ofIndividual Rights
Congress developed § 1983 to combat widespread misconduct of
local officials and political authorities. Designed to open the federal
courts to private citizens, § 1983 became "[t]he primary vehicle afforded
citizens for addressing constitutional deprivations" pervading the policies
and practices of municipal officials and state authorities.9
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .o
For almost a century after its enactment, the Supreme Court inter-
preted this language narrowly, taking a restrictive view of the law's tex-
tual implications.' The Court only permitted claims against officials in
their individual capacity acting in accordance with state law; § 1983 did
not provide a remedy for individuals injured by unsanctioned conduct. 12
In the landmark decisions of Monroe v. Pape and Monell v. Department
of Social Services of the City of New York, the Supreme Court removed
these restrictions and reinforced the original goal of individual, constitu-
tional protection. 3
8. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REv. 17, 20 (2000).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
11. Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516; Gilles, supra note 8, at 23-24.
12. Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516 (discussing the restrictive applications of § 1983
liability prior to the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1971)).
13. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
772 [Vol. 89:3
CONNICK V THOMPSON
Monroe expanded the interpretation of § 1983 to permit suit in cases
where a constitutional injury resulted from an official's abuse of power.14
Allowing the Monroe plaintiff to bring suit against police officers who
seized and detained him unlawfully, the Court opened the door for citi-
zen claims against offending officials whose misconduct rested outside
authorization by state law. The Supreme Court further expanded the
scope of § 1983 seventeen years later in Monell, holding that municipali-
ties were "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The
Monell Court acknowledged the legislative intent of the statute to pro-
vide "a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." 6
Still, the Court made clear that vicarious liability would not apply to
claims brought under § 1983; liability would attach only "when execu-
tion of [the] government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury."
Although Monell declined to fully define the contours of this municipal
liability, the Court ensured that municipalities would be held liable for
causing the individual deprivation of federally protected rights.18
By reiterating the original intent of the legislation and expanding
the scope of the statute, the Monroe and Monell decisions recognized the
importance of combating widespread misconduct and protecting individ-
ual rights in the face of state and municipal power.
B. Holding Municipalities Liable for Failing to Train Employees in City
of Canton v. Harris' 9 and Board of County Commissioners v. Brown2 0
In post-Monroe and Monell Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court
faced varied § 1983 claims and interpreted the statute to provide for a
myriad of constitutional wrongs attributable to municipal policies.2' Still,
the Court remained hesitant to impose municipal liability in cases where
a non-policy-making employee committed an unconstitutional act, not
attributable to an unconstitutional policy or custom of the government
agency. However, in 1989, in City of Canton v. Harris, the Court ex-
panded this understanding of "policy or custom" to include a municipali-
14. 365 U.S. at 184, overruled on other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
15. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691.
16. Id. at 685.
17. Id at 694.
18. Id. at 694-95.
19. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
20. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
21. See, e.g., Jett v. Dali. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736 (1989) (remanding case to
determine whether the defendants "can be considered policy makers ... such that their decisions
may rightly be said to represent the official policy of the [district] subjecting it to liability under §
1983"); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (finding that decisions of those
"officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question" may
result in municipal liability under § 1983); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985) (ruling
that plaintiffs may amend their pre-Monell action to add city as defendant because they originally
sued the director of the city's police department in his official capacity); City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (finding that unconstitutional activity was caused by an existing
unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policy maker is ordinarily required to
impose liability under Monell).
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ty's decision not to adequately train employees in "their legal duty to
avoid violating citizens' rights."22 Assessing the plaintiff's claim of inju-
ry caused by failure of the police to provide proper medical care, the
Court remanded the case to determine whether this failure could be
properly attributed to the municipality's inadequate training program.23
Liability would attach only if the decision to provide inadequate training
rose to the level of an official government policy, where the failure to
train in a relevant respect amounted to "deliberate indifference to the
[constitutional] rights of persons." 24 The Court held that "the need for
more or different training" must be "so obvious" that a failure to train
could properly be characterized as "deliberate indifference" to constitu-
tional rights.25 Further, the deficiency in the city's training program
"must be closely related to the ultimate injury" caused,26 and a munici-
pality cannot be held automatically liable for a single-incident mishap of
one of its employees. 27 Remanding the case to the court below, the Can-
ton Court provided one hypothetical example of this new standard of
liability: "[T]he need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on
the use of deadly force." 28 The Court explained that because city policy-
makers know with "moral certainty" that their police officers will use
firearms to arrest fleeing felons, a failure to train the officers in the prop-
er use of deadly weapons can be "characterized as 'deliberate indiffer-
ence' to constitutional rights." 29 The opinion made clear that in such an
event, if a city's failure to provide proper training results in actual injury,
the city could be held liable under § 1983.30
Eight years later, the Supreme Court built upon the Canton failure-
to-train rule in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown ("Bryan Coun-
ty"). 31 Further clarifying the single-incident liability hypothesized in
Canton, the Court pointed out instances in which an "inadequate train-
ing" claim could be the basis for § 1983 liability. 3 2 For example, munici-
pal policy makers' continued adherence to a training program "that they
know or should know has failed to prevent tortuous conduct by employ-
ees" can trigger municipal liability, as such inaction clearly shows "de-
liberate indifference."33 The Court contrasted this scenario with the sin-
gle incident of inadequate screening at issue in Bryan County. An isolat-
ed example of improper screening that was neither the obvious conse-
22. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011); Canton, 489 U.S. at 380.
23. Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
24. Id at 388.
25. Id. at 390.
26. Id at 391.
27. Id at 387.
28. Id. at 390 n.10.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 390.
31. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
32. See id. at 407-08.
33. Id at 407.
774 [Vol. 89:3
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quence of improper training nor the last line in a pattern of violations did
not amount to municipal liability under § 1983.34 Although the Court
suggested that for a successful § 1983 claim proof of a pattern of consti-
tutional violations is "ordinarily necessary," it acknowledged, as did
Canton, that such evidence is not always imperative. Proof of multiple
violations may not be required to prove deliberate indifference where the
single violation of constitutional rights was the "highly predictable" and
"obvious" consequence of failing to properly train.35
Whereas Canton set the stage for municipal liability by permitting
§ 1983 claims based on a city's failure to properly train its employees,
Bryan County clarified the contours and implications of the rule. Both
decisions demonstrate the Court's expanding interpretation of § 1983 as
it maintains focus on protecting individual rights.
C. Brady v. Maryland: The Importance of Stifling Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct and Protecting Individual Due Process Rights
In the century following the enactment of § 1983, the Supreme
Court also specified the role of the prosecutor in promoting constitutional
due process in the critical case of Brady v. Maryland.6 After conceding
that he participated in a gruesome murder, the accused discovered that
the prosecutor failed to disclose an accomplice's confession to the homi-
cide.37 The Brady Court determined that this suppression of evidence was
in violation of constitutional due process and announced a new rule of
discovery and mandatory disclosure. 38 Emphasizing a commitment to
justice and fair play, the Brady Court set forth the rule that "the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."3 9
Essentially, Brady provided that "on demand of an accused," the prose-
cution had a duty to disclose any evidence that would tend to exculpate
the defendant or reduce the penalty.4 0
Since this 1963 decision, the Brady rule has undergone significant
judicial alteration. Some of the most notable revisions include eliminat-
ing the need for a defendant to specifically request Brady evidence,4'
requiring disclosure in cases of both exculpatory and impeachment evi-
34. Id. at 408, 412-13, 415 (holding that a sheriff's isolated hiring decision lacked adequate
screening but did not warrant municipal liability).
35. See id. at 409-10.
36. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
37. Id. at 84.
38. Id. at 86-87.
39. Id. at 87.
40. See id. at 87-88.
41. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 704-06 (referencing the holding in United States v. Bag-
ley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
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dence,42 and amplifying the importance of not distinguishing between the
good and bad faith of the prosecutor.43
Nonetheless, one of the most prominent modifications deals with
the judiciary's retrospective interpretation of the concept of "materiali-
ty."4" Evidence is considered material only when there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different; essentially, its suppression
reduces confidence in the outcome of the trial. 4s This retroactive evalua-
tion of materiality affords prosecutors wide discretion in determining
what constitutes Brady evidence and often results in the inconsistent ap-
plication of the rule.46 The indefinite standard makes it difficult to deter-
mine with certainty whether a given piece of evidence is material or of
such significance that, if produced, it will affect the outcome of the trial
to a "reasonable probability."47 Not only is it difficult for prosecutors to
decide what to disclose under Brady, but it is also difficult for the de-
fense to know what evidence to request and for the courts to be certain
their verdicts are just.
Despite these developments, the Brady Court auspiciously
acknowledged that our system of justice "suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly" and that commanding prosecutors to disclose favorable
evidence to the accused is essential to promoting justice.48 As such,
Brady reflected the enduring commitment of our justice system to fair
play and just results for individuals accused of crimes. The Court
acknowledged, "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair. . . ."49
In sum, § 1983 set the stage for municipal liability, and Brady de-
fined prosecutorial responsibilities to the accused. Where Brady estab-
lished the prosecutorial obligation to disclose evidence, § 1983 afforded
individuals a cause of action for constitutional violations of this sort.
Recently, almost a century since Congress enacted 42 U.S.C § 1983 and
42. Id. at 702.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 n.17 (1979).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Oxman, 740 F. 2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the "ten-
dency to adopt a retrospective view of materiality"); United States v. Coppa, 267 F. 3d 132, 140 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he scope of the defendant's constitutional right . . . is ultimately defined retrospec-
tively, by reference to the likely effect that the suppression of particular evidence had on the out-
come of the trial."); Gershman, supra note 5, at 689.
45. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 434 (1995) (refining the Bagley standard holding that a showing of materiality depends on
"whether in its absence [the defendant] received a fair trial, understood as the trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence").
46. See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 853 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011) (noting "the difficulty in interpreting Brady" and the common understanding that Brady is a
"'gray' area, subject to interpretation"); Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1365 (acknowledging that "Brady
has gray areas and some Brady decisions are difficult").
47. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
48. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
49. Id. at 87.
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more than thirty years since Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court in
Connick v. Thompson faced the interplay between these seemingly com-
plimentary theories.o
II. CoNNICK V. THOMPSON
A. Facts
In 1985, the Orleans Parish District Attorney prosecuted John
Thompson for murder and an unrelated charge of attempted armed rob-
bery.51 During the robbery investigation, a cnme-scene technician col-
lected a swatch of fabric stained with the robber's blood.52 Two days
before trial, the assistant district attorney, Bruce Whittaker, acquired the
blood analysis and claimed he placed the report on the desk of his super-
visor.53 Not one prosecutor at the Orleans Parish Office disclosed the test
results to Thompson's counsel, and the evidence remained suppressed
throughout the trial. 54 In the weeks following, a jury convicted Thomp-
son of armed robbery, and because of this conviction, Thompson opted
not to testify in his own defense during his subsequent murder trial. 5
Thereafter, the jury convicted Thompson of murder and sentenced him to
death.56
In late April 1999, after eighteen years in prison, fourteen of them
isolated on death row, Thompson's private investigator unearthed the
hidden crime lab report.57 Thompson's attorneys discovered that Thomp-
son's blood type did not match the blood swatch and approached the
district attorney's office with the findings.58 In light of the newly discov-
ered evidence, the district attorney moved to stay the execution and va-
cate Thompson's armed robbery conviction.5 9 Concluding that the armed
robbery conviction unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right to
testify at his murder trial, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed
Thompson's murder conviction.60 In 2003, the district attorney's office
retried Thompson, presenting all undisclosed evidence; after only a thir-
ty-five minute deliberation, the jury found Thompson not guilty.6 ' On
May 9, 2003, after serving more than eighteen years in prison, Thompson
was set free.
50. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (addressing liability under § 1983 based on a single Brady
violation).









60. Id. at 1356-57.
61. Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Shortly thereafter, Thompson brought a § 1983 action against the
district attorney's office, claiming that the office violated Brady by fail-
ing to disclose the crime lab report to the defense.62 Thompson alleged
liability on two theories: the Brady violation was the result of (1) an un-
constitutional policy of the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office and
(2) Harry Connick's deliberate indifference to the obvious need to train
prosecutors in Brady.
B. Procedural History
Before trial, Connick, the sole policy maker for the district attor-
ney's office, conceded that his office violated Brady in its failure to dis-
close the crime lab report." At trial, the jury rejected Thompson's claim
that the Brady violation was the result of an unconstitutional office poli-
cy.65 Nonetheless, the jury found the district attorney's office liable for
failing to train its prosecutors and awarded Thompson fourteen million
dollars in damages.
Connick objected to any liability for failure to train, claiming there
was no evidence that he was aware of a pattern of Brady violations.67
The district court rejected this argument, concluding that a pattern of
violations is not necessary to prove a § 1983 claim; failure-to-train liabil-
ity attaches when a municipality demonstrates deliberate indifference to
an "obvious" need for training.68 The jury subsequently determined that
additional Brady training in the Orleans Parish Office was "obviously
necessary to ensure Brady violations would not occur"69 and found in
Thompson's favor.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and reasoning of the district court, acknowledging that Thompson "did
not need to prove a pattern" of similar Brady violations.70 In 2009, a di-
vided Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion, granted
rehearing, and affirmed the district court's decision.7 1 One year later, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
district attorney's office may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to
train based on a single Brady violation.7 2







69. Id. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).






In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, the majority held
that a district attorney's office cannot be held liable under § 1983 based
on a single Brady violation and reversed the Fifth Circuit decision." The
majority opinion relied on the Canton rule that a failure to train must
amount to deliberate indifference to the obvious need for more or differ-
ent training.7 4 Deliberate indifference required proof that a municipal
actor knew or should have known that inadequate training would conse-
*75quently cause city employees to violate citizens' rights.
The Court's opinion built heavily on this Canton standard of delib-
erate indifference and apparent notice, incorporating the idea mentioned
in Bryan County that, for the purpose of a failure-to-train claim, it is "or-
dinarily necessary" that the plaintiff prove a pattern of similar violations
by untrained employees. In cases where a plaintiff does not prove a
pattern but instead asserts "single-incident" liability, the plaintiff must
show that the failure to train is "so patently obvious" that a violation of
citizens' rights is undoubtedly a "highly predictable" consequence. 7 7 The
Court emphasized that this single-incident liability only attaches in a
narrow range of circumstances and referred to the hypothetical set forth
in Canton as fully representative of such a circumstance.
Subsequently comparing Thompson's claim with the Canton hypo-
thetical, the Court emphasized that the "obvious need for specific legal
training" present in the Canton example is absent in the context of prose-
cutorial liability.79 In stark contrast to the absence of legal training in the
police force, "[a]ttorneys are trained in the law and equipped with the
tools to interpret and apply legal principles."80 Emphasizing this differ-
ence, the Court explained that law school requirements, licensing proce-
dures, and continuing legal education are designed to ensure that all new
attorneys know how to find, understand, and apply legal rules.81 More
specifically, the majority claimed it was "undisputed . . . that the prose-
cutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general Brady rule"; as
such, additional training was unnecessary.82 The Court concluded that
recurring constitutional violations were neither "highly predictable" nor
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1359 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
75. Id. at 1360.
76. Id. (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
77. Id. at 1361 (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409).
78. Id. (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (1989) (providing an example of a city that arms




81. Id. at 1361-62.
82. Id at 1363.
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the "obvious consequence" of "failing to provide prosecutors with formal
in-house training" about Brady material.83
In sum, the majority placed Thompson's failure-to-train claim out-
side Canton's "narrow range" and determined that Thompson did not
meet the necessary standard for municipal liability under § 1983 .84
D. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Concurring with the Court in full, Justice Scalia highlighted this
case as one bad-faith prosecutor's willing Brady violation, which "could
not possibly be attributed to the lack of training."" Justice Scalia stated
that Brady mistakes are inevitable as are "all species of error routinely
confronted by prosecutors."86 The district attorney's office should not be
held liable for its employee's misconduct simply because it did not have
87a formal training program covering all species of Brady violations. To
allow such claims would result in numerous cases blaming municipalities
and second-guessing the success of government training programs.
Justice Scalia explained that the majority's rigorous standard of proof is
necessary because without it failure-to-train liability would collapse into
respondeat superior and "become a talismanic incantation producing
municipal liability" in an overwhelming display of circumstances. Jus-
tice Scalia concluded by doubting that any Brady violation existed at
all.90
E. The Dissent
Reiterating the holding of Brady v. Maryland, the dissent, authored
by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, emphasized that Thompson's conviction was fundamentally un-
fair and the result of "long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions [that]
were neither isolated or atypical."9' The dissent relied on the same Can-
ton standard set forth by the majority: "Failure to train .. can give rise
to municipal liability under § 1983 'where the failure . . . amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained
employees] come into contact."' 92 Refusing to accept the majority's as-
sertion that proof of a pattern of violations is "ordinarily necessary" or
that Thompson's case did not fit within Canton's "narrow range," the
83. Id (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring).




90. Id at 1369.
91. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).




dissent asserted that the standard of municipal liability under § 1983 was
93sufficiently met in Thompson's case.
The dissent refused to accept the idea that this case was merely the
result of a lone attorney's conduct, asserting that four prosecutors, not
one, participated in the suppression of evidence for nearly two decades. 94
The dissent pointed to evidence that demonstrated a blatant disregard for
Brady guidelines furthered by "persistent, deliberately indifferent con-
duct for which the District Attorney's Office bears responsibility under §
1983 .95 The dissent provided an account of the numerous Brady viola-
tions "that infected Thompson's trials," including suppressed police re-
ports with eye-witness accounts of the assailant, tape recordings proving
the prosecution's key witness came forward subsequent to a reward of-
fer, and the non-disclosure of blood-swatch test results. 96
Further, the dissent described an illustrative history of Connick's
cavalier approach to the importance of Brady's disclosure requirements
that "contributed to a culture of inattention" in the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office. 97 The dissent demonstrated that the majority of prose-
cutors misunderstood Brady and the office "shirked its responsibility to
keep prosecutors abreast of relevant legal developments concerning
Brady requirements." 98 Not only were the Orleans Parish prosecutors
uninformed about Brady,99 but Connick, the office's sole policy maker,
misunderstood the disclosure rule himself 00 and provided the office with
inadequate Brady training.'(' In turn, the dissent found it "hardly surpris-
ing" that Brady violations occurred and directly affected Thompson's
constitutional rights.' 02
Pointing to these numerous Brady violations and examples of pros-
ecutorial misconduct, the dissent concluded that this evidence proved the
deliberate indifference of the district attorney's office. 103 As such, the
office should bear responsibility for the "gross, deliberately indifferent,
and long-continuation violation of [Thompson's] fair trial right."'1
93. Id at 1370-71, 1377.
94. Id. at 1370.
95. Id
96. Id. at 1371-72.
97. Id at 1382.
98. Id. at 1378.
99. Id at 1378-80 (showing how the testimony of the four prosecutors engaged in prosecuting
Thompson for armed robbery and murder revealed an inconsistent and flawed understanding of a
prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady).
100. Id. at 1378 (explaining how Connick persistently misstated Brady requirements at trial).
101. Id. at 1379-80.
102. Id. at 1378.
103. Id. at 1382.
104. Id. at 1387.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Thompson Court failed to embrace the opportunity to reinforce
the original ideals of justice and fairness emphasized in the enactment of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland. The
Court overlooked the downfall of proper Brady compliance and ex-
changed the protections of § 1983 claims for a fear of overwhelming the
court system and diminishing government autonomy. As the dissent rec-
ognized, the Court could have maintained a high standard of municipal
liability while still holding the district attorney's office liable for the con-
stitutional violations it effectuated. 05 Nonetheless, the Court failed to
meet the challenge of re-enforcing the importance of justice and provid-
ing individual remedy in the face of prosecutorial misconduct. The
Thompson decision stifles the evolution of § 1983 jurisprudence and fur-
ther erodes the essential goals and promises set forth in Brady.
A. The Thompson Court Failed to Recognize the Shrinking Protections
ofBrady v. Maryland, Furthering Prosecutorial Inattention to the Im-
portance ofDisclosing Brady Evidence
While acknowledging that the duty to produce Brady evidence is
"[a]mong the prosecutors' unique ethical obligations," the majority opin-
ion offered little explanation of the nature of this responsibility.106 Focus-
ing on the existence of various rules of professional conduct and respon-
sibility, the Court assumed that prosecutors routinely make legal and
ethical judgments in accordance with Brady standards.1 07 The Court sug-
gested that an attorney's legal background and codified moral obligations
entitle a district attorney's office to rely on the prosecutors' knowledge
without providing specific training on Brady requirements. 0 8 In so as-
suming, the Court overlooked decades of scholarship and jurisprudence
suggesting that many prosecutors lack a true understanding of their dis-
closure obligations and often fall short of compliance with Brady.'09
105. Id. at 1387 n.28 (maintaining the high standard set forth in the majority and emphasizing
the infringements on Thompson's rights in its analysis, the dissent concludes that Thompson met the
standard).
106. Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).
107. See id. at 1362-63.
108. Id. at 1363.
109. E.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial suppression of evidence combined with law en-
forcement misconduct accounted for sixteen to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV.
21, 56 (1987) (documenting hundreds of overturned capital cases, including many where the prose-
cutor had suppressed exculpatory evidence); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 700-01 nn.38-42 (1987)
(citing forty cases of Brady misconduct reflected in Supreme Court, state, and lower federal court
decisions); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty
of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 848-70 (1997)
(documenting fifteen state and federal decisions in which a criminal defendant has sought to chal-
lenge his conviction under Brady, most of which ultimately led to reversal of the defendant's convic-
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1. The Growing National Problem with Brady Compliance
Because of the vague and retrospective definition of what consti-
tutes material evidence warranting disclosure, modem judicial practice
affords prosecutors certain discretion in defining and disclosing Brady
evidence. Suppressed evidence is material only if it can be shown that
there was a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense" it could have affected the outcome of the trial, resulting
in a verdict not "worthy of confidence."'"o Essentially, the prosecutor is
permitted to withhold evidence under the rational belief that, upon re-
view of the case, the appellate court will conclude there was no "reason-
able probability" that the evidence would have changed the result."' In
turn, prosecutors enjoy extraordinarily wide latitude to conceal favorable
evidence from the defense.1 2 As the dissenters in United States v. Bagley
predicted, this result-focused standard creates prosecutors who "gamble,
. . . play the odds, and .. . take a chance that the evidence will later turn
out not to have been potentially dispositive."ll 3 Justice Marshall further
explained the problem:
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves
into the duty of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must
play poses a serious obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor
... is a trained attorney who must aggressively seek convictions in
court on behalf of a victimized public. At the same time . . . he must
place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination of truth.
Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as
an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to
identify the material that could undermine his case. Given this obvi-
ously unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advocates of-
tentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence ... .114
Despite the fact that state and federal courts have heard thousands
of instances of Brady violations and reversed hundreds of convictions
tion); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 278 (2004) ("All too often prosecutorial misconduct is one of the prima-
ry reasons for [the] breakdowns in the adversary system."); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
Trial & Error; Part I: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999 (reporting that since Brady,
at least 381 defendants national have had a homicide conviction overturned based on concealed
evidence by the prosecution). See generally JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM PART 11:
WHY IS THERE So MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002)
(detailing the prevalence of mistakes in capital punishment cases and the resulting effect of execu-
tion).
110. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995).
Ill. Gershman, supra note 5, at 689-90 (explaining how many prosecutors suppress evidence
with a "completely rational expectation that the suppression either will not be discovered or, if
discovered, will be found by the reviewing court to not be material").
112. Id. at 690 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The standard for
disclosure that the Court articulates today enables prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously exculpa-
tory evidence while acting well within the bounds of their constitutional obligation.")).
113. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 696-97.
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due to the prosecution's suppression of evidence,' 15 professional disci-
pline of prosecutors is rare.1 16 Without clear legal guidelines, continuing
professional development, or ethical sanctions, Brady violations and
wrongful convictions are frequent." 7 Evidence of noncompliance with
Brady by no means indicates that all prosecutors fail to comply with the
rule; many prosecutors undoubtedly take their ethical responsibilities
seriously. Nonetheless, the reported occurrence of Brady violations re-
sulting in the deprivation of individual rights demonstrates enough over-
sight to generate concern and warrant a legal remedy. The Thompson
Court failed to acknowledge the importance of this national problem and
prevalent misconduct.
2. Lack of Brady Compliance Evident in Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office
Bolstering the claim of Connick's deliberate indifference to an ob-
vious need for training is a history of Brady violations in the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's Office under Connick's reign." 8 Of the seven
men exonerated from capital punishment in Louisiana between 1981 and
2010, four were prosecuted in Orleans Parish and all four cases involved
serious Brady violations.11 9 Nonetheless, the Thompson majority quickly
disregarded the examples as "not similar to the violation at issue here."l20
The Court explained that these past violations could not have put
Connick on notice that specific training was necessary to avoid the in-
stant constitutional violation because the current case involved scientific
evidence and the previous violations did not.121 The Court overlooks the
resulting harm that ties these violations together, a consequence that
should have put any policy maker on notice: four wrongful capital pun-
ishment convictions.
115. See supra note 109.
116. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596
(2003) (noting that existing rules of ethics fail to regulate large areas of prosecutors' professional
conduct); Rosen, supra note 109, at 703-04 (discussing the absence of remedies against prosecu-
tors); Weeks, supra note 109, at 877-78 (concluding that "the prospect of a civil suit under federal
law for a Brady violation simply does not exist"); Yaroshefsky, supra note 109, at 288 (arguing that
despite the "well documented and all too recurrent violation of professional responsibility," prosecu-
tors who engage in the intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence "are rarely, if ever, disci-
plined").
117. See supra note 109.
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.6, Smith v. Louisiana, 131 S. Ct. 2988 (2010) (No.
10-8145).
119. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995) (holding that prosecution's failure to
disclose the evidence to the defense precluded the defendant from a fair trial); State v. Bright, 875
So.2d 37, 44 (La. 2004) ("[T]he State's failure to disclose the criminal history of its key witness ...
violated defendant's due process rights . . . ."); State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. 2002);
State v. Cousin 710 So.2d 1065, 1073 (La. 2001) (reversing murder conviction and death sentences
on grounds that "clear violations of defendant's right to a fair trial ... require reversal of the convic-
tion").




Assuming a history of suppression of evidence is not representative
enough of Connick's cavalier attitude toward the disclosure of exculpato-
ry evidence to the defense, Thompson further demonstrated that Connick
himself had an inadequate understanding of Brady.122 As the Thompson
dissent illustrates, testimony of the other prosecutors in the office re-
vealed similar misunderstandings. 12 3 Yet the Court overlooked the testi-
mony of these officials, stating that an obvious need for additional train-
ing was still lacking.12 4 Finally, the Thompson Court expressed distrust of
the evidence proffered by the dissent, evidence that pointed to more
Brady violations beyond the hidden blood swatch. 125 What the dissent
deemed "violations that infected Thompson's trials,"l 2 6 the majority re-
ferred to as "legally irrelevant facts." 27 This simple difference in lan-
guage further shows the pervasive misunderstanding and legally incon-
sistent application of Brady in modern jurisprudence.
By failing to recognize the widespread misapplication of Brady, re-
sulting in constitutional violations both in Orleans Parish and throughout
the nation, the Thompson majority ignored growing prosecutorial indif-
ference and undermined the importance of Brady compliance.12 8 The
Court assumed that prosecutors "understand constitutional limits, and
exercise legal judgment," specifically in relation to Brady evidence, and
subsequently overlooked the reality of the nature of many prosecutorial
practices today.129 Consequently, the Court failed to consider the power
that upholding the need for Brady training could have on revitalizing the
original ideals of Brady and ensuring a fair and truthful trial.
B. The Court Retreatedfrom the Ideals of§ 1983 for Fear of Over-
whelming the Court System and Second-Guessing Government Au-
tonomy
Section 1983 was originally enacted to eradicate widespread mis-
conduct of state and local officials and guarantee individual protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Focused on preserving the profession-
alism of prosecutors, the Thompson Court downplayed the original rea-
son for permitting § 1983 claims and denied Thompson a remedy. Both
the dissenting and majority opinions agreed that municipal liability under
§ 1983 for failure to train attached "where the failure amounts ... to de-
liberate indifference" of a knowing municipality that obviously results in
122. Id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (detailing how "Connick persisted in misstating
Brady's requirements").
123. Id (noting that Dubelier, Assistant District Attorney, "simply relied on the police to flag
any potential Brady information"). District Attorney Williams expressed uncertainty as to whether
Brady material includes impeachment evidence. Id
124. See id at 1365 (majority opinion).
125. See id at l364 n.11.
126. Id. at 1371 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
127. Id at 1364 n. 1 (majority opinion).
128. See id.at 1365.
129. Id at 1361.
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a predictable violation of constitutional rights.130 Nonetheless, where the
dissent's attention centered on the need to protect individual due process
rights, the majority opinion focused more readily on distinguishing attor-
neys from "average public employees" than on redressing Thompson's
constitutional injury. '3 The fact that Thompson served eighteen years for
a conviction falsified by the district attorney's office received no more
than one reference in the majority opinion.' 32 Instead, the Court's deci-
sion hinged on maintaining prosecutorial autonomy and preventing the
flooding of courts with § 1983 claims.13 3
The Court repeatedly emphasized its central concern of preventing
§ 1983 liability from collapsing into respondeat superior.'34 The Court's
preoccupation with maintaining prosecutorial autonomy and profession-
alism implicitly points to a fear that acknowledging a need for Brady
training might undermine the current regime of municipal power.' 3 5
Blaming the Brady violations on one lone prosecutor, the Court praised
the unparalleled qualities of the legal profession. Highlighting how attor-
neys-unlike the hypothetical police officers mentioned in Can-
ton-undergo unique legal education, on-the-job training, and ethics
evaluations, the majority found it inconceivable that a failure to train
district attorneys ini Brady evidence would "obviously" result in constitu-
tional deprivations.' Yet, a constitutional violation did occur. And the
Court, retreating from the original intent of § 1983 to combat municipal
misconduct, effectively overlooked the need to provide Thompson a
remedy for "the deprivation of [his] rights."' 37
Justice Scalia reinforced this oversight in his concurrence. Preoc-
cupied with the repercussions of opening the prosecution to failure-to-
train claims, Justice Scalia stated that without stringent restrictions a
"'failure to train' would become a talismanic incantation producing mu-
nicipal liability '[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had his
or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee' ... . ."139 justice
130. Id. at 1370-71 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388 (1989)).
131. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 578 F.3d 293, 305 (5th Cir.
2009)).
132. Id at 1355 (mentioning Thompson's wrongful imprisonment during the initial presenta-
tion of the case).
133. See id. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. E.g., id at 1359 (majority opinion) ("[Employers] are not vicariously liable under § 1983
for their employees' actions."); id. at 1360 ("A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train
'would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities."' (quoting City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 392)); id. at 1365 ("[W]e must adhere to a 'stringent standard of fault,' lest municipal
liability under § 1983 collapse into respondeat superior." (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))).
135. See id at 1361-63.
136. Id. at 1362-63.
137. See Gilles, supra note 8, at 20, 23 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006))..
138. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting City ofCanton, 489 U.S. at 392).
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Scalia concluded that engaging the federal courts in such claims would
diminish the autonomy of state and local governments and cause an
"endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training pro-
grams."l 4 0 Justice Scalia's bold assertions made clear what the majority
opinion implicitly feared: the diminished autonomy of state and local
government agencies and a potential flood of litigants overwhelming the
court system.
Overlooking the widespread Brady violations evidenced in
Connick's office and beyond, and overemphasizing the need to restrict
municipal liability under § 1983, the majority's conclusion was misguid-
ed. It failed to recognize the constitutional protections necessary to pro-
mote a fair and just system and to preserve individual rights in the face of
state and municipal power. Focused on a fear of flooding the court sys-
tem and undermining the professionalism of the district attorney's office,
the Court left Thompson back where he started: without redress for the
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
C. Coupling Brady Obligations with § 1983 Liability, the Thompson
Court Could Have Maintained Its High Standard of Municipal Liabil-
ity and Ruled in Thompson's Favor
Connick v. Thompson presented the Court with a unique opportunity
to refocus a historically misguided understanding of Brady and further
expand municipal liability under § 1983. The Court could have united the
two concepts, curbing prosecutorial misconduct and upholding civil pro-
tections guaranteed by the Constitution. Focusing its attention on the
autonomy of municipalities and the need to isolate them from fault pre-
vented the Court from forming this union of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Moving beyond a preoccupation of potential vicarious
liability and placing Thompson's case within Canton's narrow range of
circumstances, the Court could have saved Brady from its misunderstood
existence and honored Thompson's § 1983 claim.
The Court's fear of lowering the standard of municipal liability and
subsequently flooding the court system was unfounded. Tellingly, in
1992, the Second Circuit applied the Canton rule to a similar § 1983
complaint alleging injury due to a failure to train prosecutors about
Brady.14 1 After holding the prosecution liable, the system was not flood-
ed with unnecessary § 1983 claims or overwhelmed with municipal
doubt.142 In fact, in the twenty years following that case, the Second Cir-
140. Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Walker v. New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992).
142. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1382 n.17 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("There has been no
'litigation flood or even rainfall,' in that Circuit in Walker's wake." (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 131
S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011))).
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cuit experienced no successful lawsuits for single-incident Brady viola-
tions.143
Had the Court remained unclouded by a specious fear of diminish-
ing municipal autonomy or flooding the court system, it could have ex-
panded upon the § 1983 jurisprudence following Canton and Bryan
County. Recognizing that the need for some training programs might be
"so obvious" that a policy maker's inaction could be characterized as
"deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights, Canton and Bryan
Country left open the possibility of a "narrow range of circumstances"
where single-incident § 1983 liability would attach.1" Thompson's claim
falls within this range because (1) like armed police officers, prosecutors
hold the power to change the life of an accused, (2) law school curricu-
lum cannot substitute for professionally training prosecutors in the ethi-
cal execution of this power, and (3) Connick's policy of inaction
amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.
The Thompson Court, examining the Canton hypothetical, recog-
nized the obvious need to instruct armed officers about the constitutional
limitations of using deadly force.145 Still, the Court asserted that the re-
sponsibilities in the legal profession rest in "stark contrast" to this sce-
nario.14 6 This assertion is misguided and illusory. As the Brady Court
acknowledged in the formulation of its rule, allowing a prosecutor to
withhold evidence and "shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant
... casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that
does not comport with standards of justice."1 47 History shows that prose-
cutors have taken advantage of this role and subsequently deprived indi-
viduals of their constitutional rights.148 Like an armed police officer, a
prosecutor's misconduct can have the power to effectively end the life of
an accused.14 9
Moreover, the Court contrasts the "absence of training" of "police
academy applicants" with the extensive legal training and professional
responsibility expected of prosecutors. Relying on the various require-
ments of legal education cannot save an accused from constitutional vio-
143. Id. (noting that there has been "no reported 'single violation' Brady case" since Walker
(quoting Brief for Nat'1 Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 39, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571))); Id ("Walker has prompted 'no
flood of § 1983 liability."' (quoting Brief for Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 35, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011) (No. 09-571))).
144. Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-90; Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997).
145. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
146. Id.
147. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
148. See supra note 109.
149. See supra note 109; Gershman, supra note 5, at 688 ("[TIragically, Brady violations have
not infrequently contributed to the convictions of innocent persons who, because of the prosecutor's
suppression, lacked critical evidence to prove their innocence.").
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lations.150 Generally, neither law school nor bar preparation adequately
trains novice prosecutors in the requirements of Brady sufficient to sub-
stitute for further training in practice.'5 ' Many of today's law schools
place minimal importance on teaching ethics and providing students with
a realistic impression of the practice of law.'52 Unlike most other profes-
sions, law schools require no clinical or professional experience outside
the classroom setting.' 3 As a result, many novice attorneys enter the
profession "virtually in the dark about how to practice law."'
54
In addition to providing minimal practical experience, most law
schools today foster an adversarial mindset among lawyers, rather than
an ethical one.' From the curved grading system to the minimal use of
peer collaboration, law school pedagogy is inherently competitive.156
Inexperience combined with competitive training often translates in prac-
150. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-62 (attributing the main difference between average
public employees and attorneys to legal training).
151. See id. at 1385-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing research indicating that since 1980,
Brady questions on the Louisiana Bar Examination have not accounted for even 10% of the total
points); see also infra note 152.
152. See Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A
ROADMAP 13 (2007) ("The unfortunate reality is that law schools are simply not committed to
making their best efforts to prepare all of their students to enter the practice settings that await
them."); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW 24 (2007) (emphasizing that "the underdeveloped area of legal pedagogy is clinical train-
ing"); Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, the Public,
and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 221-25, 235-42 (2007) (discussing how law
schools ineffectively prepare students and are therefore flooding the market with lawyers incompe-
tent to practice); Ursula H. Weigold, The Attorney-Client Privilege as an Obstacle to the Profession-
al and Ethical Development of Law Students, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 677, 678 (2006) ("[l]n most Ameri-
can law schools, students may graduate having very little practice or experience in many of the skills
that lawyers must possess to represent clients competently and ethically.").
153. Compare Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession:
An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 193 (1991)
("Law, unlike other professions, requires no formal apprenticeship."), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 4996.2 (West 2010) ("Each applicant shall furnish evidence satisfactory to the board that he or she
... [h]as had two years of supervised post-master's degree experience. . . ."), and N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 7704(2)(c) (McKinney 2011) (stating that to qualify for a license as a "licensed clinical social
worker," an applicant must "have at least three years full-time supervised postgraduate clinical social
work experience"), and OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4757-19-0l(C)(1)(e) (2011) (describing the licensure
requirements of social workers to include "[n]ot less than four hundred clock hours of supervised
practicum and/or field experience, with a primary focus on social intervention coordinated by a an
[sic] individual with an advanced degree in social work").
154. Dolin, supra note 152, at 235-36.
155. See Krista Riddick Rogers, Comment, Promoting a Paradigm of Collaboration in an
Adversarial Legal System: An Integrated Problem Solving Perspective for Shifting Prevailing Atti-
tudes from Competition to Cooperation Within the Legal Profession, 6 BARRY L. REV. 137, 138
(2006) ("[O]ne of the major underlying issues contributing to the crisis within the legal profession
[is] a widespread competitive, adversarial mindset among lawyers . . . ."); see also infra notes 156-
57.
156. See, e.g., Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe
to Our Students, 45 S. TEx. L. REV. 753, 777-79 (2004) (discussing that grade curves make one
person's success another's failure); Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should
Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empiri-
cally-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 572-73 (1998) ("Stud-
ies also suggest that legal education as it is currently configured tends to encourage the development
of competitive relationships among law students, instead of collaborative, supportive connections.").
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tice into the pressure to act unethically in order to win a case.' 57 In turn, a
desire to "win above all else" coupled with a lack of legal accountability
causes prosecutors to forsake the Brady rule and take their chances hid-
ing Brady evidence. 5 8 Even prosecutors attempting to comply with
Brady may fail to disclose Brady evidence simply because they misun-
derstand the unclear doctrinal guidelines or wrongly interpret the "gray
area".
Despite the increasing possibility of wrongful convictions, the min-
imal practical experience of novice attorneys, and the confusing nature of
the Brady doctrine, District Attorney Connick did little to effectively
prepare his office.160 Connick testified that he was fully aware "that his
prosecutors would regularly face Brady decisions"' 6 ' and "that constitu-
tional rights would be in jeopardy if prosecutors received slim to no
Brady training," 6 2 yet Connick gave prosecutors little to no Brady guid-
ance.6 3 The district attorney's office was aware that its prosecutors, fresh
out of law school, were not equipped with sufficient Brady training but
shirked its responsibility nonetheless.'6 Prosecutors within the office
confirmed that training at Orleans Parish was inadequate and the im-
portance of disclosing Brady evidence unclear.16 s Moreover, the 1987
policy manual guiding office conduct devoted no more than four sen-
tences to Brady, four sentences that were "inaccurate, incomplete, and
dated." 66 A quote from an Orleans Parish District Attorney, Eddie Jor-
dan, further reveals the focus of Brady training in Connick's office, "The
[Connick] administration had a policy of keeping away as much infor-
mation as possible from the defense attorney." 6 7
157. See Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Mak-
ing Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1599, 1611 (2002) (explaining how
everyday practice pushes even the most ethical lawyer to engage in conduct that is unjust and how as
a result of "the often ambiguous standards of ethics rules, professional discipline has little or no role
in preventing misconduct in litigation and only a limited role in protecting clients"); Patrick J.
Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Finn, the Elite Law School, and the Moral For-
mation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 730 (1998) (discussing how new attorneys
feel overwhelming pressure to act unethically); Rogers, supra note 155, at 138 ("This prevailing
attitude of 'anything to get ahead' or 'winning at all costs' often manifests itself in intense competi-
tion for clients as well as gamesmanship-type tactics and overly aggressive unprofessional behavior
often exercised under the guise of'zealously representing a client."').
158. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 690; see also supra note 116.
159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1360, 1380 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
how Joseph Lawless, a criminal law and procedure expert qualified to testify in trial, characterized
Connick's Brady guidance as "the blind leading the blind").
161. Id. at 1383.
162. Id. at 1384.
163. See id. at 1379-84.
164. Id. at 1387.
165. Id. at 1380 (pointing to a study conducted after Connick retired revealing that more than
half of the assistant district attorneys in Connick's office felt that they had not acquired necessary
professional training).
166. Id at 1381.
167. Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Louisiana Prosecutors' Methods Raise Scrutiny
Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 20, at A19.
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Connick ignored the pervasive misunderstanding of Brady obliga-
tions as well as the history of noncompliance within his office. In turn,
four prosecutors, none of whom were able to clearly define Brady evi-
dence when questioned at trial, participated in the suppression of materi-
al evidence that would have prevented John Thompson from serving
eighteen years in prison.16 8 Connick's disregard for the obvious need to
train his employees amounts to a deliberate indifference to a known con-
sequence of prosecutorial misconduct-wrongful convictions and subse-
quent deprivation of individual rights.
If the Court had embraced the similarities between the Canton hy-
pothetical and Thompson's case, it could have saved Brady from its mis-
understood existence in the prosecutorial community. While maintaining
the high standards required for § 1983 liability, the Court could have
reminded prosecutors of the significant role they play in the development
of a trial and guided them to promote justice and fair play above all else.
IV. CONCLUSION
In reaching its conclusion, the Thompson Court failed to recognize a
unique opportunity to reconcile the ideals of Brady v. Maryland with the
original intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, the majority focused its at-
tention on the need to isolate municipal autonomy from fault and pur-
portedly save the court system from a flood of litigation. In so doing, the
Court overlooked the growing problems with Brady compliance and sti-
fled the expansion of § 1983. By shifting its focus to preventing the
downfall of Brady and protecting the fundamental need to treat the ac-
cused fairly, the Court could have maintained high standards under
§ 1983, while simultaneously holding prosecutors liable and compensat-
ing Thompson for his loss. In failing to take a stand on legal misconduct,
the Thompson Court jeopardized the rights of future accused individuals
at the mercy of an adversary system.
Based on a misguided application of § 1983 and failure to
acknowledge the growing problem of noncompliance with Brady,
Connick v. Thompson was wrongly decided, leaving American jurispru-
dence one step further from empowering the constitutional protections
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
AFTERWORD
Only a few months after issuing the Thompson opinion, the Su-
preme Court granted review of yet another case demonstrating the Orle-
ans Parish prosecutors' failure to comply with Brady obligations. 169 On
January 10, 2012, the Court, by an 8-1 majority, reversed and remanded
the murder conviction of Juan Smith, a conviction for which Smith had
168. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1372, 1378-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
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already served a seventeen-year prison sentence.17 0 The Court based the
reversal solely on the Brady violations of the Orleans Parish District At-
torney's Office, specifically the failure of the office to disclose incon-
sistent eyewitness statements favorable to the defense and material to the
verdict.17' The Court additionally admonished the Orleans Parish Office
for its historically misguided understanding of Brady, expressing shock
that "[the] office is still answering equivocally on [such] a basic obliga-
tion . . .. 172
Smith v. Cain turns the number of capital-conviction reversals based
on Brady violations at the hands of Connick's office to an astonishing
five.17 3 These reversals, in conjunction with the numerous other non-
capital convictions vacated by appellate courts, further showcase the
Brady violations that pervaded during Connick's tenure.174 To be sure,
the long history of misconduct by the Orleans Parish Office, buttressed
by Smith v. Cain, does not automatically prove Thompson's § 1983
claim because § 1983 liability is not granted by a mere showing of repe-
tition. However, the continued unearthing of that history serves to further
highlight Connick's blatant disregard for Brady during his tenure as poli-
cy maker and in his handling of Thompson's case. Connick's deliberate
indifference to a predictable violation of individual rights in Thompson
and obvious need to train his office in proper Brady compliance increas-
es in clarity with each misapplication of justice.
Melissa Lawson Romero*
170. Id. at 631.
171. Id. at 630-31.
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 181 L. Ed. 571 (2012).
(No. 10- 8145).
173. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., State v. Knapper, 579 So. 2d 956, 961 (La. 1991); State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d
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